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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 




v. No. 1:07-CV-897-DFH-WTL 
CITY OF INDIANAPOLIS, Consolidated with 
No. 1:78-CV-388-RLY-WGH & 
Defendant. No. 1:05-CV-1220-LJM-JMS 
CONSENT DECREE IN RESOLUTION OF SUIT 
This action was brought by the United States against the City of Indianapolis, Indiana 
(the “City”), to enforce the provisions of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended 
(“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. This Court has jurisdiction of the action under 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e-5, 28 U.S.C. § 1345 and 28 U.S.C. § 1331. 
In this litigation, the United States alleges that the City violated Title VII by 
discriminating in promotions made in its Police Department on the basis of race and/or sex. The 
City denies that it violated Title VII, and, in agreeing to the entry of this Consent Decree, does 
not admit to discrimination in any form. The City maintains that it has been and remains 
committed to equal employment opportunity, including the promotion of qualified officers in the 
Police Department. As demonstration of its commitment to equal employment opportunity, the 
City notes its long history of compliance with and satisfaction of a pair of Consent Decrees and 
an Addendum concerning hiring and promotion of blacks and the hiring of women in both the 
City’s Police and Fire Departments. However, in order to avoid the risk, cost and distraction of 
further litigation, and to resolve additional claims of discrimination that have arisen in the wake 
of this litigation, the City agrees and consents to the entry of this Consent Decree to resolve the 
matters addressed herein. 
BACKGROUND 
Nearly thirty years ago, the United States and the City agreed and consented to, and the 
Court approved and entered in 1978, 1979, and 1981, respectively, two Consent Decrees and an 
Addendum concerning the hiring and promotion of black and the hiring of women police officers 
and firefighters in the City’s Police and Fire Departments. By 2005, the City had fully complied 
with the goals and purposes of those consent agreements. In related litigation that is being 
resolved separately, the United States and the City have agreed that those Consent Decrees and 
Addendum have served their purpose and are no longer necessary because of the City’s 
demonstrated history of compliance and achievement in satisfying the goals and purposes of 
those consent agreements. The City has maintained throughout the litigation, and continues to 
maintain, that it is committed to equal employment opportunity, including in its Police 
Department, and that diversity is important. 
In 2005 and 2006, eight (8) police officers in the City’s Police Department filed charges 
of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (the “EEOC”), alleging 
that the City discriminated against them based on their race (white) and/or sex (male) in delaying 
or denying their promotions to the merit ranks of Sergeant and Lieutenant in 2005. In answering 
the charges, the City denied discriminating against the police officers. 
After investigating the charges, the EEOC issued determinations in June, August and 
September 2006, concluding there was reasonable cause to believe that the City had 
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discriminated against the charging parties and similarly situated police officers in violation of 
Title VII. With respect to the six (6) charges filed by police officers who had sought promotions 
to the merit rank of Sergeant, the EEOC’s determinations found cause on the basis of both race 
and sex. And, with respect to the two (2) charges filed by police officers who had sought 
promotions to the merit rank of Lieutenant, the EEOC’s determinations found cause on the basis 
of sex alone. The EEOC then referred these cause determinations to the Department of Justice 
pursuant to Section 706 of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5, after conciliation efforts failed. 
The Department of Justice received the EEOC charge referrals in August and September 
2006, and initiated a supplemental investigation concerning the allegations. In late December 
2006, the Department of Justice learned that the City also had made promotions to the merit rank 
of Captain earlier that month, and that similar allegations were being made with respect to those 
promotions. As a result, and because its supplemental investigation was ongoing, the 
Department of Justice added these allegations with respect to the merit rank of Captain to those it 
was already investigating with respect to the merit ranks of Sergeant and Lieutenant based on the 
EEOC referrals. Based on the supplemental investigation, which included interviewing 
numerous witnesses and reviewing substantial personnel information, the Department of Justice 
concluded that the City had violated Title VII, by discriminating based on race and/or sex in 
making Police Department promotions to the merit ranks of Sergeant and Lieutenant in 2005, 
and to the merit rank of Captain in 2006. Later, in March 2008, during the pendency of this 
action, the United States learned of further similar allegations of discrimination concerning 
promotions made by the City to the merit ranks of Sergeant and Lieutenant in the Police 
Department from new eligibility lists. The United States, once again, investigated the allegations 
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because they were related and this action was ongoing, and the City defended the promotions by 
offering defenses against any potential Title VII claims and maintaining that it did not 
discriminate in any form. The EEOC has not made any cause determination with respect to the 
2008 allegations, but, based on its review, the United States concluded that these promotions 
also violated Title VII. 
The United States filed its Complaint pursuant to Section 706 of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 
2000e-5, on July 11, 2007, alleging discrimination against eight (8) named police officers who 
had sought promotions in 2005, as well as two classes of similarly situated individuals. On 
September 10, 2007, the City filed its Answer, in which the City admitted certain facts, but 
continued to deny that it had violated Title VII in any form. The City also raised a number of 
affirmative defenses to the United States’ claims, including that its promotions practices 
complied with the consent agreements entered in 1978 and 1979. 
On October 22, 2007, the EEOC issued determinations on the three (3) charges of 
discrimination filed by police officers who sought promotions to the merit rank of Captain in the 
Police Department. The EEOC concluded there was reasonable cause to believe that the City 
had discriminated against the charging parties in violation of Title VII on the basis of their race 
(white). The EEOC then referred these cause determinations to the Department of Justice 
pursuant to Section 706 of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5, after conciliation efforts failed. 
In this litigation, therefore, the United States alleges that the City violated Title VII by 
discriminating in promotions in its Police Department on the basis of race and/or sex. The City 
continues to deny that it violated Title VII, and, in agreeing to the entry of this Consent Decree, 
does not admit to discrimination in any form. Rather, the City enters into this Consent Decree in 
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an effort to avoid the cost and distraction of further litigation and to resolve these matters. 
Thus, the United States and the City, desiring that this action and the above-referenced 
allegations be settled by an appropriate Consent Decree, without the burden and risks of further 
protracted and contested litigation, agree to the jurisdiction of this Court over the parties and the 
subject-matter of this action and the above-referenced claims and allegations. Subject to the 
Court’s approval of this Decree, the parties waive hearings and findings of fact and conclusions 
of law, and further agree to the entry of this Decree as final and binding on the parties, and their 
officials, agents, employees and successors, and all persons acting on their behalf or in active 
concert or participation with them, as to all issues raised in the United States’ Complaint in this 
case. 
In resolution of this action, the United States and the City hereby AGREE to, and the 
Court APPROVES, ENTERS and ORDERS, the following: 
I. DEFINITIONS AND PARTIES 
1. The parties to this Decree are the United States, by the Department of Justice, and 
the City of Indianapolis, Indiana. 
2. “Backpay” refers to a monetary award that represents some or all of the wages 
that a Claimant would have earned up to the date of final approval and entry of this Decree if the 
Claimant had been, or had been earlier, promoted. 
3. The “City” refers to the City of Indianapolis, Indiana, which is a consolidated city 
and political subdivision created pursuant to the laws of the State of Indiana. 
4. “Claimant” refers to an individual who satisfies the eligibility requirements for 
individual remedial relief pursuant to Paragraph 15, infra, and who is identified in Paragraph 17, 
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infra. 
5. “Date of final approval and entry” of the Decree refers to the date on which the 
Court orders the entry of this Decree. 
6. “Day” or “days” refers to calendar, not business, days. 
7. “Frontpay” refers to a monetary award that represents some or all of the wages 
that a Claimant would have earned from the date of final approval and entry of this Decree up to 
the date the Claimant is promoted pursuant to Paragraph 22, infra. 
8. “Individual remedial relief ” refers to any promotion, backpay, frontpay and/or 
retroactive seniority that may be provided pursuant to this Decree to Claimants who, as a result 
of the City’s alleged race- and/or sex-based promotional practices, were not promoted or not 
timely promoted to the merit rank in the Police Department that they sought (i.e., Sergeant, 
Lieutenant or Captain). 
9. The “Police Department” refers to the Metropolitan Law Enforcement Agency, 
a/k/a the Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department, and the former Indianapolis Police 
Department, through which the City employs, or employed, police officers. Section 279-102(c) 
of the Revised Code of the Consolidated City and County designated the Metropolitan Law 
Enforcement Agency, a/k/a the Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department, as the legal 
successor-in-interest to the former Indianapolis Police Department. 
10. “Retroactive seniority” refers to a seniority award that represents some or all of 
the seniority that a Claimant would have earned for the promotion sought if the Claimant had 
been, or had been earlier, promoted. All retroactive seniority awarded pursuant to this Decree is 
seniority for all purposes, including, but not limited to, any time-in-service requirements for 
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eligibility for promotion, as well as for pension benefits. 
11. “Title VII” refers to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. 
II. PURPOSES OF THIS DECREE 
12. The purposes of this Decree are to ensure that: 
(a) the City makes promotions in the Police Department consistent with Title 
VII, and free of discrimination on the basis of race or sex; and 
(b) the City provides remedial relief, including, as appropriate, promotions, 
backpay, frontpay and retroactive seniority, to those individuals whose promotions in the 
Police Department were allegedly delayed or denied on the basis of their race and/or sex, 
as referenced in this Decree. 
III. GENERAL INJUNCTIVE RELIEF 
13. The City, its agents, officials, supervisors, employees and successors, and all 
persons acting on their behalf or in active concert or participation with them, are enjoined from: 
(a) engaging in or agreeing to any act or practice that discriminates on the 
basis of race or sex, in violation of Title VII, with respect to promotions in the Police 
Department; and 
(b) retaliating against, or in any way adversely affecting the terms and 
conditions of employment of, any person because that person has engaged in practices 
protected under Title VII, see, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a), including, but not limited to, 
cooperating with the United States’ investigation of the City and the Police Department, 
participating in the litigation of this case or seeking or receiving individual remedial 
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relief pursuant to this Decree. 
IV. INDIVIDUAL REMEDIAL RELIEF 
14. This Decree provides specific individual remedial relief to Claimants, including, 
as appropriate, promotions, backpay, frontpay and retroactive seniority. 
15. The Claimants who are eligible for individual remedial relief pursuant to this 
Decree are those: 
(a) who sought and were qualified for promotion to the merit ranks of 
Sergeant and Lieutenant in the Police Department in 2005 and 2008, and the merit rank 
of Captain in the Police Department in 2006, as defined by the respective eligibility lists 
that were certified and from which promotions were made in those years; and 
(b) whose promotions were allegedly delayed or denied on the basis of their 
race and/or sex at those relevant times. 
16. Although the parties disagree as to whether the facts stated below constitute 
unlawful employment practices under Title VII, the parties agree that the facts stated below are 
accurate: 
(a) With respect to promotions to the merit rank of Sergeant in the Police 
Department in 2005: 
(1) On January 20, 2005, the City promoted fifteen (15) police officers 
to the merit rank of Sergeant, including a white female, three (3) black females 
and a black male who all ranked lower than 26th on the eligibility list then in 
effect for such promotions. Each of the other ten (10) police officers promoted to 
the merit rank of Sergeant on January 20, 2005, ranked among the top fifteen (15) 
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places on the eligibility list then in effect for such promotions. 
(2) On August 24, 2005, the City promoted two (2) police officers to 
the merit rank of Sergeant from the same eligibility list that was used on January 
20, 2005. On September 15, 2005, the City promoted three (3) police officers to 
the merit rank of Sergeant from the same eligibility list that was used on January 
20 and August 24, 2005. On December 15, 2005, the City promoted six (6) police 
officers to the merit rank of Sergeant from the same eligibility list that was used 
on January 20, August 24 and September 15, 2005. The promotions to the merit 
rank of Sergeant that were made on August 24, September 15 and December 15, 
2005, were made in the rank order of the candidates who remained on the 
eligibility list at those times. 
(3) Thus, in 2005, the City promoted a total of twenty-six (26) police 
officers to the merit rank of Sergeant in the Police Department from the eligibility 
list, including five (5) black and/or female police officers who were promoted out 
of rank order on January 20, 2005. 
(4) The United States alleges and, solely for the purposes of this 
Decree, the City does not contest that, as a result of the City’s promotions of 
black and/or female police officers ranked lower than 26th on the eligibility list to 
the merit rank of Sergeant in 2005, the promotions of the following individuals, 
who ranked higher on the eligibility list, were delayed: (i) Mark E. Fagan, who 
ranked 9th on the eligibility list; (ii) Brian D. Churchill, who ranked 10th on the 
eligibility list; (iii) Scott A. Hessong, who ranked 12th on the eligibility list; (iv) 
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Benjamin D. Hunter, who ranked 13th on the eligibility list; (v) Richard P. 
Riddle, who ranked 14th on the eligibility list; (vi) Edward A. Bruce, who ranked 
16th on the eligibility list; (vii) Joseph S. Sherron, who ranked 17th on the 
eligibility list; (viii) Christopher L. Bailey, who ranked 18th on the eligibility list; 
(ix) Brandon C. Laser, who ranked 19th on the eligibility list; (x) Lawrence A. 
Wheeler, who ranked 20th on the eligibility list; and (xi) Daniel R. Green, who 
ranked 24th on the eligibility list. 
(5) The United States also alleges and, solely for the purposes of this 
Decree, the City also does not contest that, as a result of the City’s promotions of 
black and/or female police officers ranked lower than 26th on the eligibility list to 
the merit rank of Sergeant in 2005, the promotions of the following individuals, 
who ranked higher on the eligibility list, were denied, and these individuals have 
not since been promoted: (i) Brent E. Hendricks, who ranked 22nd on the 
eligibility list; (ii) Brent D. Miller, who ranked 23rd on the eligibility list; (iii) 
Jeffrey G. Smith, who ranked 25th on the eligibility list; and (iv) Roger T. Suesz, 
who ranked 26th on the eligibility list. 
(6) On March 5, 2008, after the establishment of a new eligibility list, 
the City promoted nine (9) police officers to the merit rank of Sergeant, including 
a white female and a black male who both ranked lower than 9th on that new 
eligibility list then in effect for such promotions. With the exception of one (1) 
police officer (white male) whom the City represents was promoted to the merit 
rank of Sergeant to fulfill a statutory provision for the promotion of former 
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Marion County Sheriffs Department personnel who had been merged into the 
Police Department and who ranked 17th on the eligibility list, each of the other 
six (6) police officers promoted to the merit rank of Sergeant on March 5, 2008, 
ranked among the top nine (9) places on the new eligibility list then in effect for 
such promotions. 
(7) Thus, from January 1 through April 11, 2008, the City promoted a 
total of nine (9) police officers to the merit rank of Sergeant in the Police 
Department from the newly established eligibility list, including a white female 
and a black male police officer who were both promoted out of rank order on 
March 5, 2008. 
(8) The United States alleges and, solely for the purposes of this 
Decree, the City does not contest that, as a result of the City’s promotions of 
black and/or female police officers ranked lower than 9th on the newly 
established eligibility list to the merit rank of Sergeant in 2008, the promotions of 
the following individuals, who ranked higher on the eligibility list, were denied, 
and these individuals have not since been promoted: (i) Jeffrey Augustinovicz, 
who ranked 7th on the eligibility list; and (ii) Jonathan R. Baker, who ranked 8th 
on the eligibility list. 
(b) With respect to promotions to the merit rank of Lieutenant in the Police 
Department in 2005: 
(1) On January 20, 2005, the City promoted eleven (11) police officers 
to the merit rank of Lieutenant, including a white female and a black male who 
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both ranked lower than 12th on the eligibility list then in effect for such 
promotions. Each of the other nine (9) police officers promoted to the merit rank 
of Lieutenant on January 20, 2005, ranked among the top eleven (11) places on 
the eligibility list then in effect for such promotions. 
(2) On December 15, 2005, the City promoted one (1) police officer to 
the merit rank of Lieutenant from the same eligibility list that was used on 
January 20, 2005. The promotion to the merit rank of Lieutenant that was made 
on December 15, 2005, was made in the rank order of the candidates who 
remained on the eligibility list at that time. 
(3) Thus, in 2005, the City promoted a total of twelve (12) police 
officers to the merit rank of Lieutenant in the Police Department from the 
eligibility list, including a female police officer who was promoted out of rank 
order on January 20, 2005. 
(4) The United States alleges and, solely for the purposes of this 
Decree, the City does not contest that, as a result of the City’s promotion of a 
female police officer ranked lower than 12th on the eligibility list to the merit 
rank of Lieutenant in 2005, the promotions of the following individuals, who 
ranked higher on the eligibility list, were delayed: (i) Robert M. McClary, who 
ranked 9th on the eligibility list; and (ii) Thomas I. Black, who ranked 10th on the 
eligibility list. 
(5) On March 5, 2008, after the establishment of a new eligibility list, 
the City promoted nine (9) police officers to the merit rank of Lieutenant, 
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including a black female who ranked lower than 9th on that new eligibility list 
then in effect for such promotions. Each of the other eight (8) police officers 
promoted to the merit rank of Lieutenant on March 5, 2008, ranked among the top 
nine (9) places on the new eligibility list then in effect for such promotions. 
(6) On April 2, 2008, the City promoted three (3) police officers to the 
merit rank of Lieutenant from the same eligibility list that was used on March 5, 
2008. The promotions to the merit rank of Lieutenant that were made on April 2, 
2008, were made in the rank order of the candidates who remained on the 
eligibility list at that time. 
(7) Thus, from January 1 through April 11, 2008, the City promoted a 
total of twelve (12) police officers to the merit rank of Lieutenant in the Police 
Department from the newly established eligibility list, including a total of nine (9) 
promotions on March 5, 2008, which included a black female police officer who 
was promoted out of rank order on March 5, 2008. 
(8) The United States alleges and, solely for the purposes of this 
Decree, the City does not contest that, as a result of the City’s promotion of a 
black female police officer ranked lower than 9th on the newly established 
eligibility list to the merit rank of Sergeant on March 5, 2008, the promotion of 
the following individual, who ranked higher on the eligibility list, was delayed: (i) 
Thomas J. Kern, who ranked 8th on the eligibility list. 
(c) With respect to promotions to the merit rank of Captain in the then-
merging Police Department in 2006: 
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(1) On December 19, 2006, the City promoted eleven (11) police 
officers in the then-merging Police Department to the merit rank of Captain, 
including three (3) black males who all ranked lower than 11th on the eligibility 
list then in effect for such promotions. With the exception of one (1) police 
officer (white male) whom the City represents was promoted to the merit rank of 
Captain in order to fulfill a specialized and required need and who ranked 13th on 
the eligibility list, each of the other seven (7) police officers promoted to the merit 
rank of Captain on December 19, 2006, ranked among the top eleven (11) places 
on the eligibility list then in effect for such promotions. 
(2) Thus, in 2006, the City promoted a total of eleven (11) police 
officers to the merit rank of Captain in the then-merging Police Department from 
the eligibility list, including three (3) black police officers who were promoted 
out of rank order on December 19, 2006. 
(3) The United States alleges and, solely for the purposes of this 
Decree, the City does not contest that, as a result of the City’s promotion of black 
police officers ranked lower than 11th on the eligibility list to the merit rank of 
Captain in 2006, the promotions of the following individuals, who ranked higher 
on the eligibility list, were delayed: (i) David E. Hensley, who ranked 8th on the 
eligibility list; (ii) Joseph W. Finch, who ranked 9th on the eligibility list; and (iii) 
Peter W. Mungovan, who ranked 10th on the eligibility list. 
17. Although the City maintains that it did not violate Title VII and denies that it 
discriminated in any form, the parties agree that the individuals identified below are the 
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Claimants who are eligible, see Paragraph 15, supra, for individual remedial relief provided 
pursuant to this Decree, and further agree that each Claimant identified below remains, subject to 
the release requirement of Paragraph 30, infra, qualified for and eligible to receive any and all 
individual remedial relief provided pursuant to this Decree: 
(a) Mark E. Fagan, individual remedial relief for his allegedly delayed 
promotion to the merit rank of Sergeant; 
(b) Brian D. Churchill, individual remedial relief for his allegedly delayed 
promotion to the merit rank of Sergeant; 
(c) Scott A. Hessong, individual remedial relief for his allegedly delayed 
promotion to the merit rank of Sergeant; 
(d) Benjamin D. Hunter, individual remedial relief for his allegedly delayed 
promotion to the merit rank of Sergeant; 
(e) Richard P. Riddle, individual remedial relief for his allegedly delayed 
promotion to the merit rank of Sergeant; 
(f) Edward A. Bruce, individual remedial relief for his allegedly delayed 
promotion to the merit rank of Sergeant; 
(g) Joseph S. Sherron, individual remedial relief for his allegedly delayed 
promotion to the merit rank of Sergeant; 
(h) Christopher L. Bailey, individual remedial relief for his allegedly delayed 
promotion to the merit rank of Sergeant; 
(i) Brandon C. Laser, individual remedial relief for his allegedly delayed 
promotion to the merit rank of Sergeant; 
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(j) Lawrence A. Wheeler, individual remedial relief for his allegedly delayed 
promotion to the merit rank of Sergeant; 
(k) Daniel R. Green, individual remedial relief for his allegedly delayed 
promotion to the merit rank of Sergeant; 
(l) Brent E. Hendricks, individual remedial relief for his allegedly denied 
promotion to the merit rank of Sergeant; 
(m) Brent D. Miller, individual remedial relief for his allegedly denied 
promotion to the merit rank of Sergeant; 
(n) Jeffrey G. Smith, individual remedial relief for his allegedly denied 
promotion to the merit rank of Sergeant; 
(o) Roger T. Suesz, individual remedial relief for his allegedly denied 
promotion to the merit rank of Sergeant; 
(p) Jeffrey Augustinovicz, individual remedial relief for his allegedly denied 
promotion to the merit rank of Sergeant; 
(q) Jonathan R. Baker, individual remedial relief for his allegedly denied 
promotion to the merit rank of Sergeant; 
(r) Robert M. McClary, individual remedial relief for his allegedly delayed 
promotion to the merit rank of Lieutenant; 
(s) Thomas I. Black, individual remedial relief for his allegedly delayed 
promotion to the merit rank of Lieutenant; 
(t) Thomas J. Kern, individual remedial relief for his allegedly delayed 
promotion to the merit rank of Lieutenant; 
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(u) David E. Hensley, individual remedial relief for his allegedly delayed 
promotion to the merit rank of Captain; 
(v) Joseph W. Finch, individual remedial relief for his allegedly delayed 
promotion to the merit rank of Captain; and 
(w) Peter W. Mungovan, individual remedial relief for his allegedly delayed 
promotion to the merit rank of Captain. 
18. Subject to the release requirement of Paragraph 30, infra, within sixty (60) days 
after the date of final approval and entry of this Decree, the City shall send, via first class mail 
with return receipt requested, checks representing backpay and prejudgment interest made 
payable to each Claimant listed below, in the amount designated below for each Claimant less 
withholdings appropriate pursuant to Paragraph 19, infra: 
(a) Mark E. Fagan, in the amount of $4,208.20 (comprised of $3,354.48 in 
backpay, and $853.72 in prejudgment interest); 
(b) Brian D. Churchill, in the amount of $4,143.16 (comprised of $3,302.64 in 
backpay, and $840.52 in prejudgment interest); 
(c) Scott A. Hessong, in the amount of $4,558.40 (comprised of $3,639.02 in 
backpay, and $919.38 in prejudgment interest); 
(d) Benjamin D. Hunter, in the amount of $4,558.40 (comprised of $3,639.02 
in backpay, and $919.38 in prejudgment interest); 
(e) Richard P. Riddle, in the amount of $4,558.40 (comprised of $3,639.02 in 
backpay, and $919.38 in prejudgment interest); 
(f) Edward A. Bruce, in the amount of $2,108.47 (comprised of $1,727.77 in 
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backpay, and $380.70 in prejudgment interest); 
(g) Joseph S. Sherron, in the amount of $2,108.47 (comprised of $1,727.77 in 
backpay, and $380.70 in prejudgment interest); 
(h) Christopher L. Bailey, in the amount of $1,693.23 (comprised of 
$1,391.39 in backpay, and $301.84 in prejudgment interest); 
(i) Brandon C. Laser, in the amount of $1,693.23 (comprised of $1,391.39 in 
backpay, and $301.84 in prejudgment interest); 
(j) Lawrence A. Wheeler, in the amount of $1,719.81 (comprised of 
$1,413.23 in backpay, and $306.58 in prejudgment interest); 
(k) Daniel R. Green, in the amount of $14,632.52 (comprised of $13,150.89 in 
backpay, and $1,481.63 in prejudgment interest); 
(l) Brent E. Hendricks, in the amount of $18,158.29 (comprised of 
$16,645.29 in backpay, and $1,513.00 in prejudgment interest); 
(m) Brent D. Miller, in the amount of $18,158.29 (comprised of $16,645.29 in 
backpay, and $1,513.00 in prejudgment interest); 
(n) Jeffrey G. Smith, in the amount of $18,163.24 (comprised of $16,649.37 
in backpay, and $1,513.87 in prejudgment interest); 
(o) Roger T. Suesz, in the amount of $18,158.29 (comprised of $16,645.29 in 
backpay, and $1,513.00 in prejudgment interest); 
(p) Jeffrey Augustinovicz, in the amount of $3,525.77 (comprised of 
$3,494.40 in backpay, and $31.37 in prejudgment interest); 
(q) Jonathan R. Baker, in the amount of $3,525.77 (comprised of $3,494.40 in 
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backpay, and $31.37 in prejudgment interest); 
(r) Robert M. McClary, in the amount of $6,844.50 (comprised of $5,507.46 
in backpay, and $1,337.04 in prejudgment interest); 
(s) Thomas I. Black, in the amount of $15,697.42 (comprised of $14,107.49 
in backpay, and $1,589.93 in prejudgment interest); 
(t) Thomas J. Kern, in the amount of $513.08 (comprised of $499.52 in 
backpay, and $13.56 in prejudgment interest); 
(u) David E. Hensley, in the amount of $9,395.03 (comprised of $8,773.85 in 
backpay, and $621.18 in prejudgment interest); 
(v) Joseph W. Finch, in the amount of $9,395.03 (comprised of $8,773.85 in 
backpay, and $621.18 in prejudgment interest); and 
(w) Peter W. Mungovan, in the amount of $9,395.03 (comprised of $8,773.85 
in backpay, and $621.18 in prejudgment interest). 
19. The City shall withhold from the backpay and frontpay (but not the prejudgment 
interest) portion of each payment listed in Paragraph 18, supra, and Paragraph 23, infra, the 
amount required by applicable federal and state income tax laws. Because police officers 
employed by the City in its Police Department do not participate in the federal Social Security 
fund, although they do participate in the federal Medicare/Medicaid funds, for each payment 
listed in Paragraph 18, supra, and Paragraph 23, infra, the City shall not withhold the amount 
required by applicable federal and state laws with respect to Social Security withholding, but the 
City shall withhold the amount required by applicable federal and state laws with respect to 
Medicare/Medicaid withholding. 
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20. Because police officers employed by the City in its Police Department do not 
participate in the federal Social Security fund, although they do participate in the federal 
Medicare/Medicaid funds, for each payment listed in Paragraph 18, supra, and Paragraph 23, 
infra, the City shall not pay the appropriate employer’s contribution to the Social Security fund 
that would have been paid by the City, but the City shall pay the appropriate employer’s 
contribution to the Medicare/Medicaid fund that would have been paid by the City. 
21. Within thirty (30) days after the City has made the payments representing 
backpay and prejudgment interest less withholdings, see Paragraphs 18 and 19, supra, the City 
shall so notify the United States in writing, and shall provide the United States with a list 
detailing: 
(a) the amount of the check made payable and sent via first class mail with 
return receipt requested to each Claimant; 
(b) the amount withheld from each Claimant’s check pursuant to federal and 
state income tax laws; and 
(c) the amount paid by the City for the employer’s contribution to the Social 
Security and/or Medicare/Medicaid fund for each Claimant. 
22. Subject to the release requirement of Paragraph 30, infra, within sixty (60) days 
after the date of final approval and entry of this Decree, and before making any other promotions 
to the merit rank of Sergeant in the Police Department, the City shall promote each Claimant 
listed below to the merit rank of Sergeant, and if all such promotions cannot be made on the 
same date, then the City shall make such promotions in the order in which the Claimants are 
listed below, beginning with (a) and ending with (f): 
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(a) Brent E. Hendricks, 
(b) Brent D. Miller, 
(c) Jeffrey G. Smith, 
(d) Roger T. Suesz, 
(e) Jeffrey Augustinovicz, and 
(f) Jonathan R. Baker. 
23. Subject to the release requirement of Paragraph 30, infra, within sixty (60) days 
of the date of final approval and entry of this Decree, the City shall mail, via regular first class 
mail with return receipt requested, checks representing frontpay made payable to each Claimant 
listed below, in the amount calculated using the formula designated below for each Claimant less 
withholdings appropriate pursuant to Paragraph 19, supra: 
(a) Brent E. Hendricks, in the amount calculated by multiplying the number 
of days from the date of final approval and entry of this Decree to the date of his 
promotion pursuant to Paragraph 22, supra, by $16.64, representing the daily difference 
in salary between a Patrol Officer and a Sergeant; 
(b) Brent D. Miller, in the amount calculated by multiplying the number of 
days from the date of final approval and entry of this Decree to the date of his promotion 
pursuant to Paragraph 22, supra, by $16.64, representing the daily difference in salary 
between a Patrol Officer and a Sergeant; 
(c) Jeffrey G. Smith, in the amount calculated by multiplying the number of 
days from the date of final approval and entry of this Decree to the date of his promotion 
pursuant to Paragraph 22, supra, by $16.64, representing the daily difference in salary 
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between a Patrol Officer and a Sergeant; 
(d) Roger T. Suesz, in the amount calculated by multiplying the number of 
days from the date of final approval and entry of this Decree to the date of his promotion 
pursuant to Paragraph 22, supra, by $16.64, representing the daily difference in salary 
between a Patrol Officer and a Sergeant; 
(e) Jeffrey Augustinovicz, in the amount calculated by multiplying the 
number of days from the date of final approval and entry of this Decree to the date of his 
promotion pursuant to Paragraph 22, supra, by $16.64, representing the daily difference 
in salary between a Patrol Officer and a Sergeant; and 
(f) Jonathan R. Baker, in the amount calculated by multiplying the number of 
days from the date of final approval and entry of this Decree to the date of his promotion 
pursuant to Paragraph 22, supra, by $16.64, representing the daily difference in salary 
between a Patrol Officer and a Sergeant. 
24. Within thirty (30) days after the City has made the payments representing 
frontpay less withholdings, see Paragraphs 23 and 19, supra, the City shall so notify the United 
States in writing, and shall provide the United States with a list detailing: 
(a) the amount of the check made payable and sent via first class mail with 
return receipt requested to each Claimant; 
(b) the amount withheld from each Claimant’s check pursuant to federal and 
state income tax laws; and 
(c) the amount paid by the City for the employer’s contribution to the Social 
Security and/or Medicare/Medicaid fund for each Claimant. 
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25. Subject to the release requirement of Paragraph 30, infra, within sixty (60) days 
of the date of final approval and entry of this Decree, the City shall credit each Claimant listed 
below with retroactive seniority for the merit rank designated below back to the date designated 
below for each Claimant: 
(a) Mark E. Fagan, retroactive seniority for the merit rank of Sergeant back to 
January 15, 2005; 
(b) Brian D. Churchill, retroactive seniority for the merit rank of Sergeant 
back to January 15, 2005; 
(c) Scott A. Hessong, retroactive seniority for the merit rank of Sergeant back 
to January 15, 2005; 
(d) Benjamin D. Hunter, retroactive seniority for the merit rank of Sergeant 
back to January 15, 2005; 
(e) Richard P. Riddle, retroactive seniority for the merit rank of Sergeant back 
to January 15, 2005; 
(f) Edward A. Bruce, retroactive seniority for the merit rank of Sergeant back 
to August 24, 2005; 
(g) Joseph S. Sherron, retroactive seniority for the merit rank of Sergeant 
back to August 24, 2005; 
(h) Christopher L. Bailey, retroactive seniority for the merit rank of Sergeant 
back to September 15, 2005; 
(i) Brandon C. Laser, retroactive seniority for the merit rank of Sergeant back 
to September 15, 2005; 
24 
(j) Lawrence A. Wheeler, retroactive seniority for the merit rank of Sergeant 
back to September 15, 2005; 
(k) Daniel R. Green, retroactive seniority for the merit rank of Sergeant back 
to December 15, 2005; 
(l) Brent E. Hendricks, retroactive seniority for the merit rank of Sergeant 
back to December 15, 2005; 
(m) Brent D. Miller, retroactive seniority for the merit rank of Sergeant back 
to December 15, 2005; 
(n) Jeffrey G. Smith, retroactive seniority for the merit rank of Sergeant back 
to December 15, 2005; 
(o) Roger T. Suesz, retroactive seniority for the merit rank of Sergeant back to 
December 15, 2005; 
(p) Jeffrey Augustinovicz, retroactive seniority for the merit rank of Sergeant 
back to March 5, 2008; 
(q) Jonathan R. Baker, retroactive seniority for the merit rank of Sergeant 
back to March 5, 2008; 
(r) Robert M. McClary, retroactive seniority for the merit rank of Lieutenant 
back to January 20, 2005; 
(s) Thomas I. Black, retroactive seniority for the merit rank of Lieutenant 
back to December 15, 2005; 
(t) Thomas J. Kern, retroactive seniority for the merit rank of Lieutenant back 
to March 5, 2008; 
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(u) David E. Hensley, retroactive seniority for the merit rank of Captain back 
to December 9, 2006; 
(v) Joseph W. Finch, retroactive seniority for the merit rank of Captain back 
to December 9, 2006; and 
(w) Peter W. Mungovan, retroactive seniority for the merit rank of Captain 
back to December 9, 2006. 
26. Within ninety (90) days of the date on which the City satisfies all of its 
obligations under Paragraphs 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24 and 25, supra, the City shall certify and 
notify the United States in writing that the City has fulfilled all of its obligations under those 
Paragraphs of this Decree. In making such certification and notification, the City shall include 
documents demonstrating its fulfillment of the obligations under Paragraphs 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 
23, 24 and 25, supra. 
V. FAIRNESS HEARING 
27. Upon provisional approval of this Decree, the Court will set a date for a fairness 
hearing to consider giving its final approval and to hear any objections filed by individuals 
affected by this Decree. The fairness hearing shall be held no less than sixty (60) days after 
provisional approval of this Consent Decree. 
28. Within ten (10) days after the date of the Court’s provisional approval of this 
Decree, the City shall provide written notice of the Court’s provisional approval of this Decree to 
each of the Claimants listed in Paragraph 17, supra, and to all incumbent sworn personnel of the 
Police Department. The notice shall provide a description of the relief to be provided pursuant 
to this Decree, specify the date, time and place for the fairness hearing, and describe the 
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procedure for filing objections to the Decree. Notice for purposes of this Paragraph shall be by 
regular first class mail to each individual’s last known address. An example of such notice is 
attached to this Decree as Appendix A. 
VI. RELEASE OF CLAIMS 
29. Within ten (10) days after the date of final approval and entry of this Decree, the 
United States shall mail to each of the Claimants listed in Paragraph 17, supra, a release of 
claims (“Release”) in the form attached to this Decree as Appendix B, along with a copy of this 
Decree. 
30. Any Claimant otherwise entitled to individual remedial relief pursuant to this 
Decree shall, to remain eligible for and obtain such individual remedial relief, sign the Release, 
have it notarized and return it to the City at the address set forth in Paragraph 38, infra. Any 
Claimant who does not return his signed and notarized Release to the City within thirty (30) days 
after the mailing of the Release, absent a showing of good cause, shall be deemed to have waived 
his entitlement to individual remedial relief pursuant to this Decree. The determination that a 
Claimant has shown good cause shall be within the sole discretion of the United States. 
31. Within forty-five (45) days after the date of final approval and entry of this 
Decree, the City shall provide to the United States a copy of each Release that is returned to the 
City by a Claimant. 
VII. DISPUTE RESOLUTION 
32. The parties shall attempt to resolve informally any dispute that may arise under 
this Decree. If the parties are unable to resolve the dispute expeditiously, and after providing 
notice to the opposing party, any party may move the Court for a resolution of the disputed issue. 
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VIII. RECORD RETENTION, COMPLIANCE MONITORING AND REPORTING 
REQUIREMENTS 
33. To the extent that the City is not already under a legal obligation to maintain such 
records, documents, data and information throughout the term of this Decree, and will not 
otherwise maintain such records, documents, data and information pursuant to routine personnel 
file maintenance policies, the City shall retain all of the following records, documents, data and 
information (including those in electronic form) during the term of this Decree: 
(a) all applications or materials submitted for promotion to any sworn 
position within the Police Department, regardless of rank or title, as well as all records, 
documents, data and information related to the evaluation of applicants and the selection 
of applicants to be promoted; 
(b) all records, documents, data and information related to written or oral 
complaints made by any applicant for employment or employee in the Police Department 
with respect to: 
(1) discrimination in promotion on the basis of race or sex, or 
(2) retaliation for complaining of, or participating in any proceedings 
involving a complaint of, such discrimination; and 
(c) all records, documents, data and information related to the individual 
remedial relief provided to any Claimant pursuant to this Decree. 
34. The United States may review compliance with this Decree at any time. Upon 
thirty (30) days written notice to the City, without further order of this Court, the United States 
shall have the right to inspect and copy any records, documents, data and information that are 
relevant to monitor the City’s compliance with this Decree, including, but not limited to, those 
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retained pursuant to Paragraph 33, supra. 
35. Additionally, the City agrees to submit the periodic reports listed below to the 
United States at the address set forth in Paragraph 37, infra, every six (6) months, detailing the 
City’s efforts in furtherance of the objectives of this Decree for so long as this Decree remains in 
effect. Each semi-annual report shall contain the information for the period of time covered by 
the report. 
(a) A list of the sworn personnel hired into the Police Department, identifying 
each such individual by name, race, sex, date of hire, rank, job assigned and salary. 
(b) A list of the sworn personnel promoted within the Police Department, 
identifying each such individual by name, race, sex, date of promotion, promoted rank, 
job assigned and salary of both the promoted rank and the rank from which the individual 
was promoted. 
(c) A list of the sworn personnel in the Police Department whose employment 
has been terminated, identifying each such individual by name, race, sex, date of hire, 
date(s) of any promotion(s), date of termination of employment and reason for such 
termination of employment. 
(d) A list or chart showing the total number of sworn personnel in the Police 
Department, identified by race and sex, who are employed in each of the various ranks. 
(e) Copies of all published policies for hiring into or promotion within the 
Police Department. 
(f) A list or chart indicating by race, sex, rank, and unit assignment the 
number or grievances or complaints concerning race and/or sex discrimination filed by 
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sworn personnel in the Police Department. 
(g) A list or chart indicating by race, sex, rank, and unit assignment the 
number of disciplinary actions brought against sworn personnel in the Police Department, 
including the type of violation involved, and the disposition of such disciplinary action. 
(h) In the event of a challenge by the United States as to the lawfulness of 
examinations for hiring into and/or promotion within the Police Department, the City 
agrees to provide the Department of Justice with such examinations and all materials 
regarding their validity. 
IX. MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS 
36. The parties shall bear their own costs and attorney’s fees in this action, except 
that the parties shall retain the right to seek costs and attorney’s fees for any matter which, in the 
future, may arise under this Decree and require resolution by the Court. 
37. Any records, documents, data and information required to be delivered pursuant 
to this Decree to the United States shall be sent to the attention of: 
Lead Attorney, Indianapolis Police Department Case 
U.S. Department of Justice 
Civil Rights Division 
Employment Litigation Section—PHB 4th Floor 
950 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. 
Washington, DC 20530 
38. Any records, documents, data and information required to be delivered pursuant 
to this Decree to the City shall be sent to the attention of: 
Corporation Counsel 
City of Indianapolis 
Office of Corporation Counsel 
1601 City-County Building 
200 E. Washington Street 
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X. 
Indianapolis, IN 46204 
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 
39. The Court shall retain jurisdiction over this Decree for the purpose of resolving 
any disputes or entering any orders that may be appropriate to implement the terms or relief 
provided in this Decree. 
40. This Decree shall dissolve and this action shall be dismissed without further order 
of the Court at the end of two (2) years from the date of final approval and entry of this Decree, 
or ninety (90) days after the City has certified and notified the United States in writing, pursuant 
to Paragraph 26, supra, that City has fulfilled all of its obligations under Paragraphs 18, 19, 20, 
21, 22, 23, 24 and 25, supra, whichever occurs later. 
02/12/2009 
IT IS SO ORDERED, this day of , 2009. 
AGREED AND CONSENTED TO: 
For plaintiff United States: 
GRACE C. BECKER 
Acting Assistant Attorney General 
RICHARD L. YOUNG, JUDGE 
___ United States District Court 
UNI Southern District of Indiana 
For defendant City of Indianapolis: 
__/s/ Andrew G. Braniff 
JOHN M. GADZICHOWSKI 
Acting Chief 
ANDREW G. BRANIFF 
__/s/ Chris W. Cotterill 
CHRIS W. COTTERILL 
Corporation Counsel 
JONATHAN L. MAYES 
31 
Trial Attorney 
U.S. Department of Justice 
Civil Rights Division 
Employment Litigation Section 
950 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. 
Patrick Henry Building, Fourth Floor 
Washington, DC 20530 
Telephone: (202) 514-3831 
Facsimile: (202) 514-1005 
Chief Litigation Counsel 
Office of Corporation Counsel 
1601 City County Building 
200 E. Washington Street 
Indianapolis, IN 46204 
Telephone: (317) 327-4055 
Facsimile: (317) 327-3968 
JOSEPH C. CHAPELLE 
ANNE B. HAYES 
Barnes & Thornburg, LLP 
11 S. Meridian Street 
Indianapolis, IN 46204 
Telephone: (317) 236-1313 
Facsimile: (317) 231-7433 
Attorneys for plaintiff United States Attorneys for defendant City of Indianapolis 
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